Understanding the Exercise of the War Powers Resolution: Who Is in Control?

Objectives:

- To examine the key War Powers Resolution sections
- To examine the historical relationship between Congress and the President as it relates to war powers
- To examine partisan political considerations
  To identify case studies
- To examine previous questions on the AP exam related to the WPR

Rationale:

Since the War Powers Resolution has appeared on the AP US Government exam as both part of the FRQs and multiple choice questions, having a firm grasp of the legislation will facilitate responding to exam questions.
History of Presidential Use of War Powers Resolution

1975: President Ford submitted a report to Congress as a result of his order to the U.S. armed forces to retake the Mayaguez, a U.S. merchant vessel which had been seized by Cambodia. This report is the only report to have cited Section 4(a)(1) (50 USC Sec. 1543(a)(1) http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1543) of the Resolution, triggering the 60-day time limit; however the operation was completed before 60 days had expired.

1981: President Reagan deployed a number of U.S. military advisors to El Salvador but submitted no report to Congress. Members of Congress filed a federal lawsuit in an attempt to force compliance with the Resolution, but the U.S. District Court hearing the suit declined to become involved in what the judge saw as a political question, namely whether U.S. forces were indeed involved in hostilities.

1982-83: President Reagan sent a force of Marines to Lebanon to participate in peacekeeping efforts in that country; while he did submit three reports to Congress under the Resolution, he did not cite Section 4(a)(1), and thus did not trigger the 60 day time limit. Over time the Marines came under increasing enemy fire and there were calls for withdrawal of U.S. forces. Congress, as part of a compromise with the President, passed Public Law 98-119 in October 1983 authorizing U.S. troops to remain in Lebanon for 18 months. This resolution was signed by the President, and was the first time a President had signed legislation invoking the War Powers Resolution.

1990-91: President George H.W. Bush sent several reports to Congress regarding the buildup of forces in Operation Desert Shield. President Bush took the position that he did not need "authority" from Congress to carry out the United Nations resolutions which authorized member states to use "all necessary means" to eject Iraq from Kuwait; however, he did ask for Congressional "support" of U.S. operations in the Persian Gulf. Congress passed, and the President signed, Public Law 102-1 authorizing the President to use force against Iraq if the President reported that diplomatic efforts had failed. President Bush did so report, and initiated Operation Desert Storm.

1993-99: President Clinton utilized United States armed forces in various operations, such as air strikes and the deployment of peacekeeping forces, in the former Yugoslavia, especially Bosnia and Kosovo. These operations were pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolutions and were conducted in conjunction with other member states of NATO. During this time the President made a number of reports to Congress "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" regarding the use of U.S. forces, but never cited Section 4(a)(1), and thus did not trigger the 60 day time limit. Opinion in Congress was divided and many legislative measures regarding the use of these forces were defeated without becoming law. Frustrated that Congress was unable to pass legislation challenging the President's actions, Representative Tom Campbell and other Members of the House filed suit in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia against the President, charging that he had violated the War Powers Resolution, especially since 60 days had elapsed since the start of military operations in Kosovo. The President noted
that he considered the War Powers Resolution constitutionally defective. The court ruled in favor of the President, holding that the Members lacked legal standing to bring the suit; this decision was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See *Campbell v. Clinton*, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000). [https://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/203/203.F3d.19.99-5214.html](https://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/203/203.F3d.19.99-5214.html) The U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal from this decision, in effect letting it stand.

**2001:** In the wake of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Congress passed Public Law 107-40, [www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ40/pdf/PLAW-107publ40.pdf](http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ40/pdf/PLAW-107publ40.pdf), authorizing President George W. Bush to "use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons." For the first time, "organizations and persons" are specified in a Congressional authorization to use force pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, rather than just nations.


**2011:** June 15, 2011 a bipartisan group of ten representatives led by former Ohio Republican Dennis Kucinich sought "injunctive and declaratory relief" from stated policy of President Barack Obama and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. The complaint refers to the possibility of the President unilaterally committing the United States to war in Libya without the declaration of war by Congress and that it was a violation of the War Powers Resolution. Judge Reggie B. Walton of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled on October 20, 2011 in the *Kucinich v. Obama* case that the plaintiffs did not have standing as either members of Congress or taxpayers so the case was dismissed. [http://www.pointoforder.com/2011/06/15/how-is-kucinich-v-obama-different-than-campbell-v-clinton/](http://www.pointoforder.com/2011/06/15/how-is-kucinich-v-obama-different-than-campbell-v-clinton/)

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Eugene Chase of Oklahoma and a Table Leader at the AP Reading supplied this to the Listserv community:

It is the War Powers Resolution H J Res 542
Its citation is PL 93-148
Nixon vetoed it – Congress overrode the veto on November 7, 1973

The Congressional Research Service has published an informative brief on it. (reprinted in part above and cited below) It may be obtained at: [http://www.fas.org/man/crs/IB81050.pdf](http://www.fas.org/man/crs/IB81050.pdf)
Yes, president can veto a joint resolution, US Constitution Article I, Section 7, Clause 3

Grimmett, Richard F. "War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance" Updated November 15, 2004

See handout
Testimony of Professor Fischer, Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2011:


What Are the Sides Claiming:

"Ninety days ago Friday [June 17], the United States and an array of allies initiated an air campaign in furtherance of a U.N. Security Council Resolution permitting the use of force to protect civilians and to establish a no-fly zone in Libya (though it seems increasingly clear that the states involved have quietly determined that regime change is a necessary condition for ensuring civilian protection over the long term). President Obama did not seek congressional authorization for this use of U.S. armed forces at the outset, and to this point still has not received such authorization. Two terrifically important legal questions arise as a result, and at least one of them has belatedly become the focus of considerable debate."

Robert M. Chesney, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Governance Studies; Brookings Institute: A Primer on the Libya/War Powers Resolution Compliance Debate


"But Congress has blinked time and time again, most recently on Libya. On June 24, the House of Representatives refused to authorize U.S. military action in Libya but also refused to limit funding. Last week, the House delivered similar confused messages.

Many Members of Congress have denounced Obama’s war. Rather than denounce Obama – or Bush in Iraq or Reagan in Panama or Truman in Korea – they should protest their own inaction."

War Powers Resolution consistently ignored; By John Isaacs, The Hill

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See handout
Testimony of Professor Fischer, Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2011:


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The following four passages of "RL32267--the War Powers Act: After Thirty Years" by Richard F. Grimmett, CRS Report for Congress, March 11, 2004, explain the Congressional Actions that may be taken under the War Powers Act of 1973. The bottom line is that Section 5(c) requires the President to remove troops at any time the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution--i.e., a bicameral resolution that does not require the president's signature. However, the constitutionality of that section has never been tested, and a 1983 Supreme Court ruling has caused members of Congress to doubt that it would be upheld.

"Section 4 requires the President to report to Congress whenever he introduces U.S. armed forces abroad in certain situations. Of key importance is section 4(a)(1) because it triggers the time limit in section 5(b). Section 4(a)(1) requires reporting within 48 hours, in the absence of a declaration of war or congressional authorization, the introduction of U.S. armed forces 'into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.'"

"All of the reports under Section 4(a), which are to be submitted to the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate, are to set forth:

(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces;
(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and
(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.

Section 4(b) requires the President to furnish such other information as Congress may request to fulfill its responsibilities relating to committing the nation to war.

Section 4(c) requires the President to report to Congress periodically, and at least every six months, whenever U.S. forces are introduced into hostilities or any other situation in section 4(a).

The objectives of these provisions, the conference report stated, was to "ensure that the Congress by right and as a matter of law will be provided with all the information it requires to carry out its constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to the use of United States Armed Forces abroad."

"Section 5(a) deals with congressional procedures for receipt of a report under section 4(a)(1). It provides that if a report is transmitted during a congressional adjournment, the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate, when they deem it advisable or if petitioned by at least 30% of the Members of their respective Houses, shall jointly request the President to convene Congress in order to consider the report and take appropriate action.

Section 5(b) was intended to provide teeth for the War Powers Resolution. After a report "is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier", section 5(b) requires the President to terminate the use of U.S. Armed Forces after 60 days unless Congress

1. has declared war or authorized the action;
2. has extended the period by law; or
3. is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack on the United States.

The 60 days can be extended for 30 days by the President if he certifies that "unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces" requires their continued use in the course of bringing about their removal.
Section 5(c) requires the President to remove the forces at any time if Congress so directs by concurrent resolution; the effectiveness of this subsection is uncertain because of the 1983 Supreme Court decision on the legislative veto. It is discussed in Part II of this report.

"On June 23, 1983, the Supreme Court in *INS v. Chadha*, ruled unconstitutional the legislative veto provision in section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. (10) Although the case involved the use of a one-House legislative veto, the decision cast doubt on the validity of any legislative veto device that was not presented to the President for signature. The Court held that to accomplish what the House attempted to do in the Chadha case "requires action in conformity with the express procedures of the Constitution's prescription for legislative action: passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment to the President." On July 6, 1983, the Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's decision striking down a provision in another law (11) that permitted Congress to disapprove by concurrent (two-House) resolution. (12) Since section 5(c) requires forces to be removed by the President if Congress so directs by a concurrent resolution, it is constitutionally suspect under the reasoning applied by the Court. (13) A concurrent resolution is adopted by both chambers, but it does not require presentment to the President for signature or veto. Some legal analysts contend, nevertheless, that the War Powers Resolution is in a unique category which differs from statutes containing a legislative veto over delegated authorities. (14) Perhaps more important, some observers contend, if a majority of both Houses ever voted to withdraw U.S forces, the President would be unlikely to continue the action for long, and Congress could withhold appropriations to finance further action. Because the War Powers Resolution contains a separability clause in section 9, most analysts take the view that the remainder of the joint resolution would not be affected even if section 5(c) were found unconstitutional. (15) Congress has taken action to fill the gap left by the possible invalidity of the concurrent resolution mechanism for the withdrawal of troops. On October 20, 1983, the Senate voted to amend the War Powers Resolution by substituting a joint resolution, which requires presentment to the President, for the concurrent resolution in section 5(c), and providing that it would be handled under the expedited procedures in section 7. The House and Senate conferees agreed not to amend the War Powers Resolution itself, but to adopt a free standing measure relating to the withdrawal of troops. The measure, which became law, provided that any joint resolution or bill to require the removal of U.S. armed forces engaged in hostilities outside the United States without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization would be considered in accordance with the expedited procedures of section 601(b) of the International Security and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, (16) except that it would be amendable and debate on a veto limited to 20 hours. (17) The priority procedures embraced by this provision applied in the Senate only. Handling of such a joint resolution by the House was left to that Chamber's discretion."
The President and War Powers:

Article I and II of the Constitution and the 1973 War Powers Resolution govern what the President can and cannot do with regard to military powers.

For each of the scenarios below, consult Article I and II of the Constitution and the 1973 War Powers Resolution to determine if the scenario is constitutional, citing specific language that authorizes or denies the constitutionality of scenario. If you cannot find specific language to relate to the scenario, conduct an Internet search to determine if the scenario is constitutional. Write your group’s decision and reason on the line provided.

Scenario #1
President George W. Bush declares war on Turkmenistan.
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Scenario #2
President Clinton sends troops to Yemen to fight terrorists. Clinton consulted the Congressional leadership before sending the troops. 73 days have passed without any congressional action. The president plans on keeping troops in Yemen for an additional 45 days.
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Scenario #3
President George H. W. Bush sends troops to Kuwait to fight the invading Iraqi army. Troops have been deployed for 104 days. Congress votes to direct the president to bring troops back to the US immediately.
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Scenario #4
A US Navy ship has been captured by the North Korean Navy. The American crew is being held on the ship in a North Korean port. President Lyndon Johnson sends US Special Forces to free the crew and ship. President Johnson informs Congressional leaders of the military operation once the Special Forces have left US airspace.
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Scenario #5
President Clinton sends troops to Bosnia as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation. Congress is informed beforehand and approved the mission initially, again 50 days later, then again five months later. After mid-term elections, a new Congress convenes and votes (House & Senate) to remove all US troops within 30 days.

Scenario #6
A US-owned ship, with a US crew, is captured by Somali pirates. Congress votes to rescue the ship and the President sends US Special Forces to rescue the ship. US Special Forces rescue the ship in a secret operation. The President cites national security reasons for not informing Congress of the details of the rescue.

Scenario #7
President Reagan authorizes the US Marine Guards posted at the US Embassy in Moscow to assassinate Russian President Gorbachev. The president plans to inform Congress within the next two days. (Hint: The answer to this question is not found in either the War Powers Resolution or the Constitution.)

Discussion Questions:
1. The War Powers Resolution has been challenged in federal court, but its constitutionality has never been ruled on by the US Supreme Court. Do you think the War Powers Resolution is constitutional? Why or why not?

2. What provisions of the War Powers Resolution would you change in order to improve it?
War Powers Resolution

Joint Resolution

Concerning the War Powers of Congress and the President.

Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SHORT TITLE

SECTION 1. This joint resolution may be cited as the "War Powers Resolution".

PURPOSE AND POLICY

SEC. 2. (a) It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.

(b) Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically provided that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

(c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.

CONSULTATION

SEC. 3. The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such situations.

REPORTING

SEC. 4. (a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced--
(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;

(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or

(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation; the president shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writing, setting forth--

(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces;

(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and

(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.

(b) The President shall provide such other information as the Congress may request in the fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to the use of United States Armed Forces abroad.

(c) Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into hostilities or into any situation described in subsection (a) of this section, the President shall, so long as such armed forces continue to be engaged in such hostilities or situation, report to the Congress periodically on the status of such hostilities or situation as well as on the scope and duration of such hostilities or situation, but in no event shall he report to the Congress less often than once every six months.

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

SEC. 5. (a) Each report submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1) shall be transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate on the same calendar day. Each report so transmitted shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate for appropriate action. If, when the report is transmitted, the Congress has adjourned sine die or has adjourned for any period in excess of three calendar days, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate, if they deem it advisable (or if petitioned by at least 30 percent of the membership of their respective Houses) shall jointly request the President to convene Congress in order that it may consider the report and take appropriate action pursuant to this section.

(b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of
United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the President determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces.

(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.

CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR JOINT RESOLUTION OR BILL

SEC. 6. (a) Any joint resolution or bill introduced pursuant to section 5(b) at least thirty calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such section shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and such committee shall report one such joint resolution or bill, together with its recommendations, not later than twenty-four calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such section, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.

(b) Any joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents), and shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(c) Such a joint resolution or bill passed by one House shall be referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported out not later than fourteen calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b). The joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question and shall be voted on within three calendar days after it has been reported, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect to a joint resolution or bill passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such resolution or bill not later than four calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5(b). In the event the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective Houses in disagreement. Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or
concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than the expiration of such sixty-day period.

**CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR CONCURRENT RESOLUTION**

SEC. 7. (a) Any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to section 5(b) at least thirty calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such section shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and one such concurrent resolution shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.

(b) Any concurrent resolution so reported shall become the pending business of the House in question (in the case of the Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the proponents and the opponents), and shall be voted on within three calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(c) Such a concurrent resolution passed by one House shall be referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection (a) and shall be reported out by such committee together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days and shall thereupon become the pending business of such House and shall be voted on within three calendar days after it has been reported, unless such House shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.

(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of Congress with respect to a concurrent resolution passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of conference shall make and file a report with respect to such concurrent resolution within six calendar days after the legislation is referred to the committee of conference. Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the consideration of such reports, such report shall be acted on by both Houses not later than six calendar days after the conference report is filed. In the event the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective Houses in disagreement.

**INTERPRETATION OF JOINT RESOLUTION**

SEC. 8. (a) Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances shall not be inferred--

(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before the date of the enactment of this joint resolution), including any provision contained in any appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes the introduction of United States Armed
Forces into hostilities or into such situations and stating that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution; or

(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such treaty is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and stating that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution.

(b) Nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed to require any further specific statutory authorization to permit members of United States Armed Forces to participate jointly with members of the armed forces of one or more foreign countries in the headquarters operations of high-level military commands which were established prior to the date of enactment of this joint resolution and pursuant to the United Nations Charter or any treaty ratified by the United States prior to such date.

(c) For purposes of this joint resolution, the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces" includes the assignment of member of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government when such military forces are engaged, or there exists an imminent threat that such forces will become engaged, in hostilities.

(d) Nothing in this joint resolution--

(1) is intended to alter the constitutional authority of the Congress or of the President, or the provision of existing treaties; or

(2) shall be construed as granting any authority to the President with respect to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances which authority he would not have had in the absence of this joint resolution.

SEPARABILITY CLAUSE

SEC. 9. If any provision of this joint resolution or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the joint resolution and the application of such provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.

EFFECTIVE DATE

SEC. 10. This joint resolution shall take effect on the date of its enactment.

CARL ALBERT
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

JAMES O. EASTLAND
President of the Senate pro tempore.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U.S.,


The House of Representatives having proceeded to reconsider the resolution (H. J. Res 542) entitled "Joint resolution concerning the war powers of Congress and the President", returned by the President of the United States with his objections, to the House of Representatives, in which it originated, it was

Resolved, That the said resolution pass, two-thirds of the House of Representatives agreeing to pass the same.

Attest:
W. PAT JENNINGS
Clerk.

I certify that this Joint Resolution originated in the House of Representatives.

W. PAT JENNINGS
Clerk.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

November 7, 1973

The Senate having proceeded to reconsider the joint resolution (H. J. Res. 542) entitled "Joint resolution concerning the war powers of Congress and the President", returned by the President of the United States with his objections to the House of Representatives, in which it originate, it was

Resolved, That the said joint resolution pass, two-thirds of the Senators present having voted in the affirmative.

Attest:
FRANCIS R. VALEO
Secretary.
Sources

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/warpower.asp


http://loc.gov/law/help/war-powers.php
